Servidor MCP
aml
com.oceanalt/aml
Qué hace este MCP
Screens blockchain addresses and payment endpoints, decodes transaction intent, verifies x402 payment requirements, and produces payment risk decisions.
Capacidades
Herramientas
10
herramientas
attest_control_baseline
File your own control-baseline attestation (free)
File your operator's control-baseline attestation — the counterpart to counterparty_control_baseline. That tool asks what controls the OTHER side runs; this one publishes what YOUR side runs, so payers can see it before settling with you. No account, no key, one call. Gaps are allowed and expected: answer false where a control is not in place and describe how you plan to close it in gapPlan. A filing with declared gaps is worth far more than no filing — it lets a payer decide against a known shape instead of a blank. Get the control ids from the baseline list first. Only file for a party you are actually authorised to speak for.
Acceso externo
Idempotente
Esquema de entrada
{'type': 'object', 'required': ['entity', 'answers'], 'properties': {'entity': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'The accountable party\'s legal or commonly-used name, e.g. "Acme Robotics Ltd". This is who the attestation is about — not your agent\'s name.'}, 'agentId': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'Optional. If this party already has an agent registered with OceanAlt, link the attestation to it.'}, 'answers': {'type': 'object', 'description': 'Map of control id to boolean, e.g. {"ACB-1.1": true, "ACB-2.1": false}. Control ids come from the baseline list (see baseline_controls).'}, 'contact': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'Optional contact for follow-up. Not published.'}, 'gapPlan': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'For controls answered false: how and when you plan to close them. Plain text.'}}}
baseline_controls
List the control-baseline questions (free)
Fetch the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline: the list of controls an agent operator is expected to run before it is allowed to move money, each answerable yes or no. Call this before attest_control_baseline so you file against real control ids. Each control carries which gate enforces it and why it exists.
Solo lectura
Idempotente
Esquema de entrada
{'type': 'object', 'required': [], 'properties': {}}
check_calldata_intent
Decode calldata and compare with declared intent (free)
Anti blind-signing. EVM: decodes what a transaction's calldata will actually do (ERC-20 transfer/approve/permit, setApprovalForAll, ownership transfer, native transfer). Solana: decodes a whole base64 transaction (SPL Token / Token-2022 Transfer, TransferChecked, Approve, SetAuthority, CloseAccount, Burn; System Transfer / Assign; ATA creation). Compares it with what you believe you are doing. EVM: pass intent:{action:'pay', to, amount} plus contract (the transaction's to) and data (hex calldata). Solana: pass network:'solana' and transaction (base64) instead of data. decision match = does what you declared; mismatch = different recipient/amount/asset, or an approval / authority change instead of a payment — do not sign; unknown = could not decode (including address-lookup-table accounts), which is not the same as safe.
Solo lectura
Idempotente
Esquema de entrada
{'type': 'object', 'properties': {'data': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'EVM only: 0x-prefixed hex calldata.'}, 'value': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'EVM only: native value in wei (optional).'}, 'intent': {'type': 'object', 'required': ['action', 'to'], 'properties': {'to': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'EVM: recipient address. Solana: wallet or token account.'}, 'asset': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'EVM: symbol/contract (optional). Solana: mint address (optional, checked against TransferChecked).'}, 'action': {'enum': ['pay'], 'type': 'string'}, 'amount': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'Base units (e.g. 10 USDC = 10000000).'}}}, 'network': {'type': 'string', 'description': "'solana' to decode a Solana transaction; EVM chain name or CAIP-2 id otherwise (optional)."}, 'contract': {'type': 'string', 'description': "EVM only: the transaction's `to` field (token contract for ERC-20 payments, or the recipient for native transfers)."}, 'transaction': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'Solana only: base64-serialized transaction or message.'}}}
counterparty_control_baseline
Check a counterparty's control baseline before paying (free)
Answers a different question from address screening. Screening asks whether an address is risky; this asks how much damage the agent on the other side could do if it were talked into something. Returns that party's self-attestation against the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline, split into two sets that must NOT be conflated: verified_by_oceanalt (enforced by the gateway on every payment — provable) and self_claimed (what they state about their own side — NOT verified by OceanAlt). Most parties have not attested: found:false means no information, not a bad signal.
Solo lectura
Acceso externo
Idempotente
Esquema de entrada
{'type': 'object', 'properties': {'entity': {'type': 'string', 'description': "The counterparty's entity name."}, 'agentId': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'Their agent id, if you have that instead.'}}}
payment_decision
Decide whether this payment should happen (free)
"Before your agent pays, call OceanAlt once." Pass the payee address the agent is about to pay; get a machine-executable decision: allow | review | decline, plus verifiable evidence and retry semantics — use it as a gate: if the decision is not "allow", do not pay. On allow/review it also returns a verifiable compliance attestation you can attach to the settlement so the payment carries proof it passed OceanAlt's decision. Free, no API key.
Solo lectura
Acceso externo
Idempotente
Esquema de entrada
{'type': 'object', 'required': ['to'], 'properties': {'to': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'Payee address the agent is about to pay. EVM: 0x + 40 hex. Tron: T + 33 base58.'}, 'lang': {'enum': ['en', 'zh'], 'type': 'string', 'description': 'Language for human-readable fields (signals, note, advice). Defaults to English.'}, 'task': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'Optional payment intent: what this payment is for. Sending task, reasoning or maxAmountUsdc opts into a deterministic intent check; an empty intent is itself a finding (requires_information).'}, 'network': {'enum': ['ethereum', 'base', 'bsc', 'polygon', 'arbitrum', 'optimism', 'avalanche', 'arc'], 'type': 'string', 'description': 'EVM chain for the payee (optional; ignored for Tron).'}, 'purpose': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'Short purpose/memo (optional).'}, 'reasoning': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'Optional payment intent: why this payee. Instruction-override phrases here route the payment to review.'}, 'amountUsdc': {'type': 'number', 'description': 'Amount in USDC (optional; recorded, not required for the decision).'}, 'maxAmountUsdc': {'type': 'number', 'description': 'Optional declared per-payment cap in USDC. amountUsdc above it → decline.'}}}
recent_flagged
List recently flagged addresses (free)
Return a representative sample of addresses on OceanAlt's reviewed risk list — OFAC-sanctioned, known mixers, and community-reported scam/phishing — each with its source category and reason. Takes no arguments. Free, no API key.
Solo lectura
Acceso externo
Esquema de entrada
{'type': 'object', 'properties': {}}
resolve_agent_identity
Resolve an agent's chain of accountability (free)
Resolves who stands behind a paying agent: agent -> principal -> mandate -> credential -> wallet. Each link reports whether it holds; completeness counts how many do (a factual count, not a score). Wherever the chain breaks is where accountability stops. Publication is opt-in and only posture is exposed (that a ceiling exists, never its value), so found:false means the agent has not published — absence of information, not a bad signal.
Solo lectura
Acceso externo
Idempotente
Esquema de entrada
{'type': 'object', 'required': ['agentId'], 'properties': {'agentId': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'The agent id to resolve.'}}}
screen_address
Screen a payee address for AML risk (free)
Run an AML compliance screen on a single blockchain address BEFORE paying or receiving from it — the pre-payment check on a counterparty. Checks OFAC sanctions, known mixers, community scam/phishing lists, stablecoin issuer freezes, and on-chain heuristics. Returns a verdict (clear | caution | risky), a 0–100 risk score, a blocked flag, and the matching signals — receipts, not a black-box score. A clear verdict means nothing was found in the data OceanAlt holds; it is not a statement that the address is safe. Depth varies by chain (see coverage.chains at /.well-known/agent-capabilities). Supports EVM (0x…), Tron (T…), Solana (base58). Free, no API key.
Solo lectura
Acceso externo
Idempotente
Esquema de entrada
{'type': 'object', 'required': ['address'], 'properties': {'lang': {'enum': ['en', 'zh'], 'type': 'string', 'description': 'Language for human-readable fields (signals, note, advice). Defaults to English.'}, 'address': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'Address to screen. EVM: 0x + 40 hex. Tron: T + 33 base58. Solana: base58 public key.'}, 'network': {'enum': ['ethereum', 'base', 'bsc', 'polygon', 'arbitrum', 'optimism', 'avalanche', 'arc'], 'type': 'string', 'description': 'EVM chain (optional; auto-defaults to ethereum; ignored for Tron/Solana).'}}}
screen_endpoint
Screen a payment endpoint for phishing (free)
Screen a payment ENDPOINT (URL or domain) before calling it — the half that address screening cannot answer. In x402 the agent discovers a URL first, receives a 402, and only then learns where to pay: if that endpoint is spoofed, the payee address it hands back is freshly generated and appears on no sanctions list. Checks the hostname and its parent domains against public phishing databases (MetaMask eth-phishing-detect, ScamSniffer) plus hostname shape signals (bare IP, punycode homograph, deep subdomain nesting, free hosting). Returns clear | caution | risky | unknown with language-independent signal_keys. A clear verdict means no match was found, NOT that the endpoint is safe — freshly registered phishing hosts always precede any list. Use together with screen_address. Free, no API key.
Solo lectura
Acceso externo
Idempotente
Esquema de entrada
{'type': 'object', 'required': ['url'], 'properties': {'url': {'type': 'string', 'description': 'Full URL or bare domain of the payment endpoint, e.g. https://pay.example.com/x402 or pay.example.com'}, 'lang': {'enum': ['en', 'zh'], 'type': 'string', 'description': 'Language for human-readable fields. Defaults to English.'}}}
verify_payment_requirements
Verify a signed x402 402 response (free)
Before paying an x402 402 response, check that its payment requirements (payTo, amount, asset, network, resource) were signed by the seller and not altered in transit by a proxy, CDN, SDK or another tool. x402 v2 carries the requirements in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED response header (base64 JSON): pass either the decoded JSON or the raw base64 value as body. Optionally pass expect:{payTo, amount} — the address and amount you are about to pay — and the tool also checks they match what was signed. verified:false with reason_code no_signature means the seller does not sign (unprotected, not necessarily malicious); digest_mismatch or signature_invalid means the response was tampered with — do not pay.
Solo lectura
Acceso externo
Idempotente
Esquema de entrada
{'type': 'object', 'required': ['body'], 'properties': {'body': {'description': 'The decoded PAYMENT-REQUIRED header JSON (object), or the raw base64 header value (string).'}, 'expect': {'type': 'object', 'properties': {'payTo': {'type': 'string'}, 'amount': {'type': 'string'}}, 'description': 'What you are about to pay; checked against the signed fields.'}, 'keys_url': {'type': 'string', 'description': "Override the seller's public-key URL (defaults to extensions.signedRequirements.keys_url)."}}}
Historial
Cambios recientes en herramientas
Modificado
screen_address
23 de September de 2026 a las 02:53
Modificado
payment_decision
23 de September de 2026 a las 02:53
Añadido
check_calldata_intent
17 de September de 2026 a las 12:36
Añadido
verify_payment_requirements
17 de September de 2026 a las 12:36
Añadido
recent_flagged
17 de September de 2026 a las 12:36
Añadido
resolve_agent_identity
17 de September de 2026 a las 12:36
Añadido
baseline_controls
17 de September de 2026 a las 12:36
Añadido
attest_control_baseline
17 de September de 2026 a las 12:36
Añadido
counterparty_control_baseline
17 de September de 2026 a las 12:36
Añadido
screen_endpoint
17 de September de 2026 a las 12:36
Añadido
screen_address
17 de September de 2026 a las 12:36
Añadido
payment_decision
17 de September de 2026 a las 12:36
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